xlsx-official
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pydynamically compiles a C compatibility shim at runtime usinggccand injects it into the LibreOffice (soffice) process using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This technique is used to override network socket behaviors in restricted or sandboxed environments. - Evidence: The
_ensure_shimfunction inscripts/office/soffice.pywrites C source code to a temporary file and executesgcc -shared -fPICto create a library. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs various system-level operations including CLI tool execution and configuration management.
- Evidence: Executes
soffice,gcc, andgitviasubprocess.runacross several scripts includingrecalc.pyandscripts/office/validators/redlining.py. - Evidence: Automatically writes StarBasic macros to the user's local LibreOffice configuration directory (
~/.config/libreoffice/...or~/Library/Application Support/LibreOffice/...) to enable automated formula recalculation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted spreadsheet data (.xlsx, .csv, .tsv) via libraries like
pandasandopenpyxlwithout utilizing structural delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore potentially malicious content embedded in the data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Spreadsheet data is loaded in
SKILL.mdandrecalc.py. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructional content.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
soffice,gcc,git), persistent configuration modification, and file system access. - Sanitization: No input filtering or content escaping logic was detected.
Audit Metadata