xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Runtime library compilation and process injection.
- Evidence: The file
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains embedded C source code designed to intercept socket calls. This code is written to a temporary file, compiled usinggccinto a shared object, and loaded into the LibreOffice process space via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. - Intent: This technique is used to provide fallback AF_UNIX socket support in restricted or sandboxed environments.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Execution of system-level binaries.
- Evidence: Multiple scripts (
recalc.py,scripts/recalc.py,scripts/office/soffice.py,scripts/office/validators/redlining.py) utilizesubprocess.runto call external tools includingsoffice(LibreOffice),gcc,git, andtimeout. These are used for tasks like formula recalculation, diffing spreadsheet content, and managing runtime environment shims. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Potential risk surface through untrusted data ingestion.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via
pandas.read_excelandopenpyxl.load_workbook(referenced inSKILL.md) when processing user-provided spreadsheet files. - Boundary markers: Absent; no specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content are provided for the data being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
subprocess.runinrecalc.pyandsoffice.py) and file system write operations. - Sanitization: Content from processed Excel files is not explicitly sanitized before being handled by the agent context.
Audit Metadata