c-messaging
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill allows the agent to read untrusted incoming data from external messaging platforms, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
imsg read,imsg list,wacli read, andwacli listcommands as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or protective instructions are present in
SKILL.mdto isolate message content from the agent's internal logic. - Capability inventory: The skill grants the agent the ability to send messages via
imsg sendandwacli sendinSKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external message content before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of local command-line tools
imsgandwaclito interact with iMessage and WhatsApp. While these are core functionalities, they represent a significant capability surface on the host system.
Audit Metadata