skills/daxaur/openpaw/c-schedule/Gen Agent Trust Hub

c-schedule

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configures persistence on the host operating system by creating launchd plists in ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ (macOS) or modifying crontab (Linux) to execute scheduled tasks via the openpaw command-line tool.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because its primary use cases involve processing untrusted content from external sources like emails and GitHub notifications.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads and summarizes untrusted external data from email systems and GitHub activity.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or boundary markers are identified in the instructions to protect the model from embedded malicious commands in processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write to the local filesystem (specifically ~/.config/openpaw/), execute system-level commands through schedulers, and transmit data externally via the Telegram delivery method.
  • Sanitization: There is no documented evidence of input validation or sanitization for the external data being summarized.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill maintains sensitive data including task results, cost logs, and job schedules in the user's home directory (~/.config/openpaw/). It also supports a telegram delivery method which transmits task results to an external network endpoint.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 9, 2026, 08:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — c-schedule