c-schedule
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configures persistence on the host operating system by creating launchd plists in
~/Library/LaunchAgents/(macOS) or modifyingcrontab(Linux) to execute scheduled tasks via theopenpawcommand-line tool. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because its primary use cases involve processing untrusted content from external sources like emails and GitHub notifications.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and summarizes untrusted external data from email systems and GitHub activity.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or boundary markers are identified in the instructions to protect the model from embedded malicious commands in processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write to the local filesystem (specifically
~/.config/openpaw/), execute system-level commands through schedulers, and transmit data externally via the Telegram delivery method. - Sanitization: There is no documented evidence of input validation or sanitization for the external data being summarized.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill maintains sensitive data including task results, cost logs, and job schedules in the user's home directory (
~/.config/openpaw/). It also supports atelegramdelivery method which transmits task results to an external network endpoint.
Audit Metadata