paid-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill executes bunx @lucid-agents/cli, which downloads the latest version of a remote package from the npm registry at runtime.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By using bunx to run an unpinned remote package, the skill performs remote code execution. This allows the tool to run arbitrary code fetched from the internet during the scaffolding process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: User-supplied inputs such as {agent-name} are passed directly into shell commands in Step 2 (bunx @lucid-agents/cli {agent-name}) and Step 6 (gh repo create {agent-name}). This creates a command injection vulnerability where a malicious user could provide input containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &, |) to execute unintended commands.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user requirements and interpolates them into the agent's workflow.
  • Ingestion points: User input for agent name and endpoints in Step 1.
  • Boundary markers: None identified.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including shell execution (Bash), file system modification (Write, Edit), and network-facing operations via gh and railway-deploy.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the {agent-name} variable before it is used in shell execution strings.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 06:49 PM