paid-agent
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill executes
bunx @lucid-agents/cli, which downloads the latest version of a remote package from the npm registry at runtime. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By using
bunxto run an unpinned remote package, the skill performs remote code execution. This allows the tool to run arbitrary code fetched from the internet during the scaffolding process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: User-supplied inputs such as
{agent-name}are passed directly into shell commands in Step 2 (bunx @lucid-agents/cli {agent-name}) and Step 6 (gh repo create {agent-name}). This creates a command injection vulnerability where a malicious user could provide input containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|) to execute unintended commands. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user requirements and interpolates them into the agent's workflow.
- Ingestion points: User input for agent name and endpoints in Step 1.
- Boundary markers: None identified.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including shell execution (
Bash), file system modification (Write,Edit), and network-facing operations viaghandrailway-deploy. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the
{agent-name}variable before it is used in shell execution strings.
Audit Metadata