bilibili-source
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script
scripts/bili-subs.shusesyt-dlp --cookies-from-browserto access user credentials stored in local browser cookie databases. This access is intended to allow the skill to fetch login-gated Bilibili subtitles. The skill documentation explicitly describes this requirement and instructs the agent to ask for user permission before execution.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external content from Bilibili, including video titles, tags, and danmaku (bullet comments), which are then processed by the agent.\n - Ingestion points:
scripts/bili-fetch.sh(API metadata) andscripts/bili-danmaku.sh(danmaku text).\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The scripts return data directly to the agent's context.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, perform network operations, and read browser cookies.\n
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the fetched text content is performed to prevent prompt injection.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell scripts (
.sh) and external CLI utilities such ascurl,jq, andyt-dlpto fetch and process data.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Inscripts/bili-danmaku.sh, data retrieved fromapi.bilibili.comis piped to apython3command:curl ... | python3 -c \"import sys,zlib; ...\". This pattern involves passing remote data directly to a code interpreter for decompression.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from Bilibili's public and authenticated APIs (api.bilibili.com,b23.tv) and usesyt-dlpto interact with remote media and subtitle servers.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://api.bilibili.com/x/v1/dm/list.so?oid=$cid - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata