bilibili-source

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script scripts/bili-subs.sh uses yt-dlp --cookies-from-browser to access user credentials stored in local browser cookie databases. This access is intended to allow the skill to fetch login-gated Bilibili subtitles. The skill documentation explicitly describes this requirement and instructs the agent to ask for user permission before execution.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external content from Bilibili, including video titles, tags, and danmaku (bullet comments), which are then processed by the agent.\n
  • Ingestion points: scripts/bili-fetch.sh (API metadata) and scripts/bili-danmaku.sh (danmaku text).\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The scripts return data directly to the agent's context.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, perform network operations, and read browser cookies.\n
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the fetched text content is performed to prevent prompt injection.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell scripts (.sh) and external CLI utilities such as curl, jq, and yt-dlp to fetch and process data.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In scripts/bili-danmaku.sh, data retrieved from api.bilibili.com is piped to a python3 command: curl ... | python3 -c \"import sys,zlib; ...\". This pattern involves passing remote data directly to a code interpreter for decompression.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from Bilibili's public and authenticated APIs (api.bilibili.com, b23.tv) and uses yt-dlp to interact with remote media and subtitle servers.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://api.bilibili.com/x/v1/dm/list.so?oid=$cid - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 3, 2026, 03:05 AM