bilibili-source
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/bili-subs.shexecutesyt-dlpwith the--cookies-from-browserflag. This command accesses local browser sqlite databases to retrieve session cookies required for Bilibili's login-gated subtitle API. While this is the intended functionality for fetching transcripts, it involves sensitive local data access. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/bili-danmaku.shuses a multi-line shell pipe topython3 -cto perform raw DEFLATE decompression on API responses. This is a local data transformation step using a static python one-liner. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with Bilibili's public APIs (
api.bilibili.com) and resolves short links viab23.tv. These are well-known services and the network operations are restricted to the skill's primary purpose. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Evaluation of the automated scanner alert regarding the pipe from
curltopython3inscripts/bili-danmaku.sh. Analysis confirms this is a false positive for remote code execution; the data from the URL is passed to a local python script for decompression, not executed as a script itself. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface detected.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/bili-danmaku.shreads arbitrary danmaku text from an external API. - Boundary markers: Absent; danmaku text is emitted as raw lines.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via bundled scripts.
- Sanitization: Absent; no filtering or escaping is applied to the bullet comment text before it is presented to the agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://api.bilibili.com/x/v1/dm/list.so?oid=$cid - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata