capture-screen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of dynamic code execution to interact with macOS APIs and UI elements.\n
- Inline Swift code execution:
swift -e 'import CoreGraphics ...'is used to enumerate windows.\n - AppleScript execution:
osascript -e 'tell application ...'is used throughoutSKILL.mdto control application state (zoom, scroll, activate).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses AppleScript (osascript) to perform complex UI automation.\n - Commands include activating applications, manipulating window properties, selecting spreadsheet cells, and opening files (
open POSIX file).\n - Uses
screencaptureto save image data to the file system.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The troubleshooting documentation includes instructions for high-privilege system access.\n references/permission-triage-template.mdsuggests usingsudo sqlite3to query the protected TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) database at/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db.\n- While intended for debugging permission issues, these instructions provide a template for an agent to access sensitive system privacy records.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to instructions embedded in external system data.\n
- Ingestion points: The
get_window_id.swiftscript (specifically window titles read viakCGWindowName) inscripts/get_window_id.swift.\n - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in window titles.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
osascript(system control),screencapture(file writes), andswift(system API access).\n - Sanitization: There is no sanitization or validation of the window titles before they are presented to the agent, allowing a malicious window title to potentially influence agent behavior.
Audit Metadata