github-review-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub pull requests, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Reads PR title, body, commits, and comments via
gh pr viewandgh apicalls. Boundary markers: Instructions explicitly state to treat PR-controlled content as untrusted and to load agent instructions (AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md, etc.) only from the current base branch. Capability inventory: The skill utilizesgit(fetch, merge, cherry-pick),ghCLI (api, pr merge), and executes repository-defined tests. Sanitization: Instructs the use of isolated temporary clones or sandboxes for test execution and the removal of unrelated credentials from the environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute tests provided in external pull requests. Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to 'Run untrusted tests in an isolated temporary clone or sandbox'. This capability is a fundamental part of the skill's validation workflow. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of shell commands via
gitandghCLI to interact with the repository and GitHub API. Evidence: Multiple scripts throughout the instruction set use commands likegit fetch,git merge-tree,gh pr view, andgh apito manage the review and landing process.
Audit Metadata