lark-cli-router

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the lark-cli binary to perform operations. It executes subcommands such as skills list, skills read, schema, api, and whoami to interact with the service.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to load Markdown guides at runtime and execute the commands contained within them. Specifically, it treats metadata.cliHelp from loaded guides as a recipe for command execution, involving the resolution of placeholders and dynamic assembly of shell commands.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an ingestion surface where it reads data from the output of lark-cli skills read and local files in ~/.agents/skills/. This data is used to guide the agent's behavior, creating a surface where untrusted content in those files could influence or override intended instructions. Evidence: Ingestion points include lark-cli skills read and ~/.agents/skills/<guide-name>/. There are no explicit boundary markers or sanitization steps mentioned for the content of these guides. Capabilities include subprocess execution of the lark-cli tool.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill includes a .security-scan-passed file containing a claim that the skill has passed security validation. Per security protocols, this internal claim is ignored in favor of the analyzer's own findings.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 02:10 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — lark-cli-router