lark-cli-router
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
lark-clibinary to perform operations. It executes subcommands such asskills list,skills read,schema,api, andwhoamito interact with the service. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to load Markdown guides at runtime and execute the commands contained within them. Specifically, it treats
metadata.cliHelpfrom loaded guides as a recipe for command execution, involving the resolution of placeholders and dynamic assembly of shell commands. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an ingestion surface where it reads data from the output of
lark-cli skills readand local files in~/.agents/skills/. This data is used to guide the agent's behavior, creating a surface where untrusted content in those files could influence or override intended instructions. Evidence: Ingestion points includelark-cli skills readand~/.agents/skills/<guide-name>/. There are no explicit boundary markers or sanitization steps mentioned for the content of these guides. Capabilities include subprocess execution of thelark-clitool. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill includes a
.security-scan-passedfile containing a claim that the skill has passed security validation. Per security protocols, this internal claim is ignored in favor of the analyzer's own findings.
Audit Metadata