llm-wiki-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of external investment documents like earnings call transcripts and analyst reports into a personal wiki. This activity creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. \n * Ingestion points: Files are read from the
raw/directory and compiled intowiki/knowledge pages (referenced inSKILL.mdandreferences/ingest_sop.md). \n * Boundary markers: The instructions mandate a "HITL 5 卡点" (Human-In-The-Loop) process, forcing the agent to stop and obtain user confirmation for takeaways, entity creation, and classification at five distinct stages. \n * Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for local file reading/writing (viascripts/init_vault.pyandscripts/lint-vault.py) and utilizes Git for version control and automation. \n * Sanitization: The skill relies on human oversight and manual verification instead of automated code-based sanitization for incoming text content. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local Python scripts (scripts/init_vault.py,scripts/lint-vault.py) and shell-based Git hooks (templates/pre-commit.snippet) to scaffold the project structure and validate markdown link integrity. These are standard utility scripts for maintaining a file-based knowledge system. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The linter workflow uses theuvtool to load thepyyamldependency for parsing frontmatter in the vault files. This process fetches the package from official registries, which is recognized as a well-known service and a standard development practice.
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