openclaw
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill is designed to read and modify configuration files located in the user's home directory (e.g.,
~/.openclaw/openclaw.jsonand~/.kimi_openclaw/openclaw.json), which are documented inreferences/openclaw_architecture.mdto contain sensitive information such asapiKey. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule inscripts/openclaw_config.pyto execute system commands. It attempts to restart theopenclaw-gatewayservice by callingsystemctl restart openclaw-gateway,systemctl --user restart openclaw-gateway, and theopenclawCLI tool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external JSON configuration files and model definitions to perform its operations.
- Ingestion points: Configuration files are loaded via
load_configinscripts/openclaw_config.pyand model definitions are loaded viaload_model_jsoninscripts/add_model.py. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between configuration data and administrative instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the file system (saving configs and creating/pruning backups in
config-backups/) and to restart system services via subprocess calls. - Sanitization: The skill uses standard JSON parsing (
json.load) but lacks secondary validation or sanitization of the content of these files before they influence the agent's logic or are written back to disk.
Audit Metadata