pdf-to-html
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/verify_render.pyusessubprocess.runto invoke a local Google Chrome or Chromium binary. This is used for the primary purpose of visual verification by rendering the generated HTML and taking screenshots. - Evidence: Found in
scripts/verify_render.pywithin theshootfunction. - Context: The command is executed using a list of arguments, which mitigates shell injection, and serves a documented functional requirement of the skill.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from PDF files, which is eventually interpolated into agent prompts during the optional translation workflow described in
references/translation_workflow.md. - Ingestion points:
extract_pdf.pyreads content from a user-provided PDF;translation_workflow.mduses the extracted text. - Boundary markers: The prompts in
translation_workflow.mdcontain instructions for fidelity but do not use clear delimiters to isolate untrusted content from instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files (
scripts/build_html.py) and execute system commands (scripts/verify_render.py). - Sanitization: Content is escaped for HTML output in
scripts/build_html.py, but the raw text is passed to agents for translation without specialized prompt sanitization.
Audit Metadata