pdf-to-html

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/verify_render.py uses subprocess.run to invoke a local Google Chrome or Chromium binary. This is used for the primary purpose of visual verification by rendering the generated HTML and taking screenshots.
  • Evidence: Found in scripts/verify_render.py within the shoot function.
  • Context: The command is executed using a list of arguments, which mitigates shell injection, and serves a documented functional requirement of the skill.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from PDF files, which is eventually interpolated into agent prompts during the optional translation workflow described in references/translation_workflow.md.
  • Ingestion points: extract_pdf.py reads content from a user-provided PDF; translation_workflow.md uses the extracted text.
  • Boundary markers: The prompts in translation_workflow.md contain instructions for fidelity but do not use clear delimiters to isolate untrusted content from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files (scripts/build_html.py) and execute system commands (scripts/verify_render.py).
  • Sanitization: Content is escaped for HTML output in scripts/build_html.py, but the raw text is passed to agents for translation without specialized prompt sanitization.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 30, 2026, 04:13 PM