read-claude-web-conversation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/cdp_channel.pyaccesses sensitive browser profile directories (e.g.,~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome) to read theDevToolsActivePortfile. Access to browser profile paths is high-risk as these directories contain session cookies and history. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill injects and executes arbitrary JavaScript into the user's active browser tabs using
Runtime.evaluatevia CDP (scripts/cdp_channel.py) andexecute javascriptvia AppleScript (scripts/runjs.applescript). This allows the skill to perform actions with the user's active session. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:
scripts/cdp_channel.pyexecutes thepsutility usingsubprocess.runto enumerate running processes. This is used to detect automation instances and avoid routing errors when using AppleScript. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
scripts/render_transcript.pyutility processes untrusted data originating from external Claude conversations (which may include web search results) and renders it into transcripts for further agent processing. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via JSON payloads fetched from the Claude web API and processed by
render_transcript.py. - Boundary markers: The script employs Markdown headers (
## human,## assistant) and Obsidian callouts (> [!info]-) to delimit conversation turns and tool outputs. - Capability inventory: The skill can write rendered transcripts to the local filesystem and execute JavaScript within the browser context to download files.
- Sanitization: The script uses Markdown fences to wrap content but does not perform explicit sanitization of embedded instructions within the conversation data.
Audit Metadata