read-claude-web-conversation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script scripts/cdp_channel.py accesses sensitive browser profile directories (e.g., ~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome) to read the DevToolsActivePort file. Access to browser profile paths is high-risk as these directories contain session cookies and history.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill injects and executes arbitrary JavaScript into the user's active browser tabs using Runtime.evaluate via CDP (scripts/cdp_channel.py) and execute javascript via AppleScript (scripts/runjs.applescript). This allows the skill to perform actions with the user's active session.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: scripts/cdp_channel.py executes the ps utility using subprocess.run to enumerate running processes. This is used to detect automation instances and avoid routing errors when using AppleScript.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The scripts/render_transcript.py utility processes untrusted data originating from external Claude conversations (which may include web search results) and renders it into transcripts for further agent processing.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via JSON payloads fetched from the Claude web API and processed by render_transcript.py.
  • Boundary markers: The script employs Markdown headers (## human, ## assistant) and Obsidian callouts (> [!info]-) to delimit conversation turns and tool outputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write rendered transcripts to the local filesystem and execute JavaScript within the browser context to download files.
  • Sanitization: The script uses Markdown fences to wrap content but does not perform explicit sanitization of embedded instructions within the conversation data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 03:06 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — read-claude-web-conversation