read-codex-history
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and display historical conversation data from multiple local providers (Claude, Codex, Kimi). This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions stored in past logs could be re-interpreted by the agent during a history audit.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/analyze_sessions.py,scripts/read_codex_session.py, andscripts/list_codex_user_inputs.pyread content from local JSONL, SQLite, and metadata files. - Boundary markers: The skill formats results into Markdown briefings for the agent. While it uses headers and labels to organize the data, there are no specific markers instructing the model to ignore embedded instructions in the historical text.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes local Python scripts that have the ability to run shell commands (via
subprocessforgit,rg, andgrep), read various home directory paths, and write to temporary files. - Sanitization: The skill performs Markdown escaping (pipe characters) and whitespace normalization. It also truncates long inputs to fit within model context windows.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts utilize system commands to gather metadata or optimize searches.
scripts/_core/text.pyusessubprocess.Popento invokeripgrep(rg) orgrepfor high-speed file filtering. This implementation follows security best practices by using the-eflag for keywords and--to terminate arguments before paths, preventing flag injection.scripts/read_codex_session.pyexecutesgitcommands (branch, status, log) to report the current workspace state. These calls use hardcoded argument lists, mitigating injection risks.
Audit Metadata