skill-governance
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/audit_codex_skill_surface.pyscript uses Python'ssubprocessmodule to execute thecodexcommand-line utility. It runscodex debug prompt-inputto inspect the model's active catalog andcodex app-serverto retrieve the full unshortened skill inventory. These operations are diagnostic and intended for state verification. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted metadata from external
SKILL.mdfiles during its audit routines. - Ingestion points:
scripts/audit_project_skill_roots.pyandscripts/audit_codex_skill_surface.pyread and parse YAML frontmatter from skill bundles in.agents/skills,.claude/skills, and user-defined project directories. - Boundary markers: The instructions include a 'Non-negotiable safety boundaries' section that explicitly mandates read-only behavior for audits and requires manual user authorization for any mutations such as moving, retiring, or installing skills.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages
subprocessfor system interaction and performing filesystem operations including directory traversal, file reads, and SHA256 hashing to detect drift. - Sanitization: The scripts implement regular expression validation for skill names to ensure they follow a strict lowercase-and-hyphen schema, but they do not sanitize description fields or instruction bodies, which could contain instructions meant to influence the auditing agent.
Audit Metadata