skill-governance

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts in the skill (scripts/audit_claude_skill_surface.py, scripts/audit_codex_skill_surface.py, and scripts/audit_skill_delivery.py) utilize subprocess.run and subprocess.Popen to invoke system binaries such as 'claude' and 'codex'. This functionality is intended to collect diagnostic information about the agent's environment.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The scripts/audit_codex_skill_surface.py script performs dynamic loading and execution of Python code using exec(compile(...)) and importlib. It targets a local management script, by default ~/.config/claude-switch-models-setup/sync-local-skill-sources.py, to parse activation policies. This mechanism is used for interoperability with local configuration tools.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes data from external tool outputs (e.g., claude plugin marketplace list --json and codex debug prompt-input). While the scripts parse this data as JSON, the content of these external sources could theoretically contain malicious instructions if the underlying system state is compromised.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/audit_claude_skill_surface.py (line 72), scripts/audit_codex_skill_surface.py (lines 124, 219).
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly present for the ingested JSON streams.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including file system reading and shell command execution via subprocesses across all audit scripts.
  • Sanitization: The skill uses standard json.loads for parsing, which prevents basic structural injection but does not sanitize the semantic content of the metadata fields for potential downstream influence.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 04:11 PM