remarkable
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from a reMarkable tablet, including OCR text and handwritten annotations, which can contain hidden instructions.
- Ingestion points: Content enters via the
remarkable_readtool (page text, highlights),remarkable_search(OCR text), and rendering of annotation layers viaremarkable_imagefor transcription tasks defined inreferences/transcription-brief.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific delimiters or negative constraints to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the documents or notes it reads.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute local binaries via
scripts/rm_mcp.pyand has the ability to write files (such as PNG renders) to the local disk. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or filtering for the OCR text or transcription results before they are processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/rm_mcp.pyusessubprocess.Popento execute theremarkable-mcpserver binary. It uses theREMARKABLE_MCP_CMDenvironment variable to determine the command to run, which facilitates the execution of local binaries for tool communication.
Audit Metadata