jev
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent on processing a
stateobject containing external data, which is a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: The
statefield in theclient.system_oneAPI call accepts arbitrary data (e.g.,ticket_text). - Boundary markers: The instructions recommend using backticked paths (e.g.,
`ticket.messages[0].text`) to scope judgments to specific data fields. - Capability inventory: The skill examples include business logic capabilities like routing tickets (
route_to_billing), escalating issues (escalate), and adding to backlogs. - Sanitization: The skill provides excellent defensive guidance, stating: "Treat text in the state as able to steer the answer. Jev does not treat state as hostile. State in the criteria what counts, and test injected and self-describing content before deployment." It also mandates using "Confidence-gated routing" to ensure automated actions only occur when the model is certain.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the
typesafe_sdkPython package and official TypeSafe documentation. - Evidence: The code snippet imports
typesafe_sdkand the source list links to thedocs.typesafe.aidomain. - Note: These resources are essential and standard for the service the skill is intended to support.
Audit Metadata