blender-render-farm
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runto interact with the Thinkbox DeadlinedeadlinecommandCLI. The path to the executable can be optionally provided as a tool argument (deadline_command), which allows the execution of arbitrary binaries on the host system. This pattern is present across multiple scripts includingcancel_render_job.py,get_render_job_status.py,list_render_jobs.py,render_farm_status.py, andsubmit_render_job.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the active Blender scene which is then used in downstream operations.
- Ingestion points: Scene file paths, job names, and render settings are retrieved via the
bpymodule insubmit_render_job.py,validate_scene_for_farm.py, andwrite_render_job.py. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates or data processing logic to separate scene data from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via
subprocess.run, write files to disk viaopen().write(), and perform network operations viaurllib.request. - Sanitization: The skill uses list-based arguments for subprocess calls and
json.dumps()for API payloads, which provides some protection against basic injection, but does not prevent logic-based attacks via malicious scene metadata. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to Flamenco Manager instances to manage render jobs. The
flamenco_server_urlis configurable via tool arguments or environment variables (FLAMENCO_SERVER_URL), directing the agent to communicate with external endpoints. This network activity is used incancel_render_job.py,get_render_job_status.py,list_render_jobs.py,render_farm_status.py, andsubmit_render_job.py.
Audit Metadata