migrating-tauri-apps
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install official Tauri CLI tools and plugins from the @tauri-apps organization using npm and cargo. These resources come from well-known sources within the software development ecosystem.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The migration process relies on the execution of shell commands through package managers (npm, yarn, pnpm, cargo) to automate the updating of dependencies and configuration files.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Because the skill is designed to guide an agent in analyzing and rewriting user-supplied project configuration (tauri.conf.json) and source files (.rs, .js, .ts), it creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: Content is read from local user files, including project manifests and source code files. 2. Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to ensure the agent isolates user-provided code from its own instructional context. 3. Capability inventory: The agent is tasked with writing changes to the local filesystem and executing commands for dependency management. 4. Sanitization: The instructions do not define routines for sanitizing or validating the content found within user project files before it is processed by the agent.
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