skills/deapi-ai/skills/deapi-audio/Gen Agent Trust Hub

deapi-audio

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it fetches transcription results from a remote service and presents the raw text directly to the agent's context.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/speech-to-text.sh (line 62) fetches content via curl from a RESULT_URL generated by the API.
  • Boundary markers: The transcription content is not wrapped in delimiters or accompanied by instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool for script execution and the Write tool for configuration management.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the fetched transcription text before it is displayed to the agent.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of remote resources for processing.
  • The deapi_ensure_local_file function in scripts/common.sh uses curl to download files from user-provided URLs passed via --audio or --ref-audio arguments to a temporary directory.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell scripts to perform its core operations, including network communication with the deAPI infrastructure and local file management.
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file contains a dynamic context injection pattern used for configuration verification.
  • Evidence: ! cat ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/config.json 2>/dev/null || echo "NOT_CONFIGURED" executes at skill load time to check for the existence of an API key.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 2, 2026, 10:24 PM