deapi-audio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it fetches transcription results from a remote service and presents the raw text directly to the agent's context.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/speech-to-text.sh(line 62) fetches content viacurlfrom aRESULT_URLgenerated by the API. - Boundary markers: The transcription content is not wrapped in delimiters or accompanied by instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool for script execution and theWritetool for configuration management. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the fetched transcription text before it is displayed to the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of remote resources for processing.
- The
deapi_ensure_local_filefunction inscripts/common.shusescurlto download files from user-provided URLs passed via--audioor--ref-audioarguments to a temporary directory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell scripts to perform its core operations, including network communication with the deAPI infrastructure and local file management.
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a dynamic context injection pattern used for configuration verification. - Evidence:
! cat ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/config.json 2>/dev/null || echo "NOT_CONFIGURED"executes at skill load time to check for the existence of an API key.
Audit Metadata