notion-infographic
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use shell commands (e.g.,
claude -p ...) to dispatch tasks to sub-agents. These commands use file reading and interpolation ($(cat workspace/prompts/task-${task}.md)), which is a pattern that can lead to unintended execution if the environment or variables are manipulated. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow relies heavily on
web_searchandweb_fetchto gather data from untrusted external sources, which is a prerequisite for indirect injection attacks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection because it processes data from external websites without sufficient sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
web_searchandweb_fetchtools defined inreference/subagent-prompt.mdandSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are used when processing the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
web_search,web_fetch,write, shell execution via theclaudeCLI, andimageGentools. - Sanitization: There are no mechanisms identified for escaping or validating the content retrieved from the web before it is used to influence the Lead Agent's planning and generation phases.
Audit Metadata