notion-infographic

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use shell commands (e.g., claude -p ...) to dispatch tasks to sub-agents. These commands use file reading and interpolation ($(cat workspace/prompts/task-${task}.md)), which is a pattern that can lead to unintended execution if the environment or variables are manipulated.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow relies heavily on web_search and web_fetch to gather data from untrusted external sources, which is a prerequisite for indirect injection attacks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection because it processes data from external websites without sufficient sanitization or boundary markers.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through web_search and web_fetch tools defined in reference/subagent-prompt.md and SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are used when processing the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to web_search, web_fetch, write, shell execution via the claude CLI, and imageGen tools.
  • Sanitization: There are no mechanisms identified for escaping or validating the content retrieved from the web before it is used to influence the Lead Agent's planning and generation phases.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 13, 2026, 03:16 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — notion-infographic