xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
recalc.pyscript executes system-level binaries using thesubprocessmodule to perform office document operations. - Evidence: The script calls
soffice(LibreOffice),timeout, andgtimeoutto trigger formula recalculation in a headless environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill modifies the local application environment by writing configuration files to the user's home directory.
- Evidence: The
setup_libreoffice_macrofunction inrecalc.pycreates a StarBasic macro file (Module1.xba) in the LibreOffice configuration path (~/.config/libreoffice/on Linux or~/Library/Application Support/LibreOffice/on macOS). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from external Excel files.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied
.xlsxfiles read viapandasandopenpyxlas instructed inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded in spreadsheet cells.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (via
recalc.py) and perform file system operations. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not include logic to validate or sanitize content extracted from spreadsheet cells before it enters the agent's context.
Audit Metadata