xlsx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The recalc.py script executes system-level binaries using the subprocess module to perform office document operations.
  • Evidence: The script calls soffice (LibreOffice), timeout, and gtimeout to trigger formula recalculation in a headless environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill modifies the local application environment by writing configuration files to the user's home directory.
  • Evidence: The setup_libreoffice_macro function in recalc.py creates a StarBasic macro file (Module1.xba) in the LibreOffice configuration path (~/.config/libreoffice/ on Linux or ~/Library/Application Support/LibreOffice/ on macOS).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from external Excel files.
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied .xlsx files read via pandas and openpyxl as instructed in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions embedded in spreadsheet cells.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (via recalc.py) and perform file system operations.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not include logic to validate or sanitize content extracted from spreadsheet cells before it enters the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 13, 2026, 03:16 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — xlsx