pulls
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources like GitHub PR descriptions, comments, and reviews, which could contain malicious instructions.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads PR content using
gh pr view,gh pr checks, and related commands as part of themonitorandbabysitworkflows (SKILL.md,references/monitor.md).\n - Boundary markers: It includes strong instructions to treat reviewer feedback as untrusted input, requiring verification of any suggested changes in the source code or via reproduction before execution (
references/monitor.md).\n - Capability inventory: The skill can execute GitHub mutations (create, edit, merge, close PRs) and can trigger other skills like
fix-itortest-itto perform code changes and verification (SKILL.md).\n - Sanitization: It explicitly mandates using
--body-filewith theghCLI for multiline content to prevent command injection from untrusted text interpolation (references/ops.md).\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on local command-line tools for Git and GitHub operations.\n - Evidence: Frequent use of
git(e.g.,git status,git push) and the GitHub CLIgh(e.g.,gh pr create,gh pr merge) to interact with the repository and platform APIs.
Audit Metadata