apps-vtex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external VTEX commerce APIs (catalog, search, and checkout). This untrusted data is processed and presented to the agent, creating a potential vector for malicious content to influence agent logic.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched through the
client.tsfunctions (vtexFetch,vtexCachedFetch,intelligentSearch) and various files in theloaders/directory. - Boundary markers: The skill uses
utils/transform.tsto map raw VTEX responses into schema.org formats, providing a degree of data normalization. - Capability inventory: The skill manages network requests to commerce endpoints and handles browser cookies for session and cart state.
- Sanitization: While transformations are applied, there is no explicit evidence of sanitization specifically designed to neutralize prompt injection within the ingested data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes the use of build-time code generation tools within the developer's local environment.
- Evidence: References like
references/cart-wiring.mdandreferences/audit-checklist.mdmention runningbun run generateand usingbunx tsxto execute the@decocms/blocks-clitool for generating server-side function bindings.
Audit Metadata