skills/dedene/skills/architect-loop/Gen Agent Trust Hub

architect-loop

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to invoke external command-line interface (CLI) tools, including codex, cursor-agent, and grok. These tools are executed in a background shell to 'dispatch' work to other AI agents.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill involves runtime generation of executable-like content. It writes a 'builder block' to docs/builder-block.md which contains instructions and specifications. This generated file is then immediately used as input for the shell commands mentioned above.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a feedback loop that ingests data from docs/HANDOFF.md. This file is designed to be updated by an external 'Builder' agent (e.g., GPT-5.5 or Grok). Because the Architect agent (the one using this skill) rules on the Builder's 'disagreements' and uses the file's state to generate subsequent shell commands, a malicious or compromised Builder could inject data that influences the Architect's future actions or the content of the commands it executes.
  • Ingestion points: docs/HANDOFF.md is read at the start of every session to extract state, disagreements, and results.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the skill treats the content of the handoff file as authoritative 'memory'.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (codex exec, cursor-agent, grok) and write to the filesystem (docs/HANDOFF.md, docs/builder-block.md, .git/info/exclude).
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or validation of the text read from docs/HANDOFF.md before it is incorporated into the next slice spec or builder block.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The builder profile for 'cursor' in references/builder-profiles.md defines a dispatch command: cursor-agent -p --model <model> "$(cat docs/builder-block.md)". This specific pattern uses shell sub-shell expansion ($(...)) to pass the entire contents of a file as a command-line argument. If the content of docs/builder-block.md (which includes data from the untrusted Builder) contains shell metacharacters like backticks, semicolons, or pipe symbols, it could lead to arbitrary command injection on the host system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 24, 2026, 01:52 PM