last30days-local
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and summarize content from social media platforms, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Scraper scripts (e.g.,
scripts/engine/sources/aside_x.py,scripts/engine/sources/reddit_keyless.py,scripts/engine/sources/youtube_ytdlp.py) fetch untrusted text from X, Reddit, YouTube, and other feeds. - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mdcontains an explicit warning instructing the agent to treat all scraped text as untrusted content and to never follow instructions found within it. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via
subprocess.run(found inscripts/engine/backend.pyandscripts/engine/sources/youtube_ytdlp.py) and perform network requests viaurllib.request(found inscripts/engine/httpget.py). - Sanitization: The skill processes fetched data and provides it to the agent; while the agent is warned, the raw text from external sources is not explicitly sanitized of potential prompt-overriding content before presentation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill wraps and executes several external binaries to perform data extraction tasks.
- Evidence:
scripts/engine/backend.pyexecutes theasideCLI to run JavaScript for browser-based scraping.scripts/engine/sources/youtube_ytdlp.pyexecutes theyt-dlpbinary, andscripts/engine/sources/github_issues.pyexecutes the GitHub CLI (gh). - Implementation: These executions use the list-based
subprocess.runAPI without a shell (shell=False), which follows security best practices for executing system commands by preventing shell metacharacter injection.
Audit Metadata