podcast-to-shorts
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/clip-finder.mjsexecutes shell commands usingnode:child_process.execSync. The commands are parsed fromclip-plan.mdby identifying lines that start withffmpeg. Because the content of the plan file is derived from external transcript data and can be influenced or modified by the agent, there is a risk of command injection if the file is manipulated to include additional shell operators or malicious commands. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external, untrusted podcast and video transcripts. These transcripts are parsed and then presented to a subagent for auditing and creative judgment. A malicious transcript could contain hidden instructions or adversarial content designed to override the agent's logic or bypass the safety and quality rails defined in the skill instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the environment through
transcript.txtand is processed byscripts/clip-finder.mjsand the main agent. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are used when passing transcript content to the subagent auditor in
templates/clips-auditor-brief.md. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via
execSyncinscripts/clip-finder.mjsand file system modification throughnode:fsmethods across its scripts. - Sanitization: The scripts do not perform any sanitization, escaping, or validation on the transcript text before it is interpolated into files or prompts.
Audit Metadata