deepgram-python-text-to-speech
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions describe an environment that ingests untrusted text data for audio synthesis, creating a potential surface for prompt injection if the source text is attacker-controlled.
- Ingestion points: The
textparameter inclient.speak.v1.audio.generateand thetextfield withinSpeakV1Textused in WebSocket streaming. - Boundary markers: Absent; the provided code snippets do not include delimiters or specific instructions to treat input text as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The code demonstrates capabilities to perform network requests (Deepgram API synthesis) and write files to the local filesystem (
output.raw). - Sanitization: Absent; there is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or validating the input text before it is sent to the synthesis engine.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation includes instructions to download and install additional components from an external source.
- Evidence: The skill suggests running
npx skills add deepgram/skillsto obtain cross-language product knowledge and MCP setup. This targets the vendor's own namespace. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides shell commands intended for execution to extend the agent's capabilities.
- Evidence: The
npx skills add deepgram/skillscommand is provided in a bash block for setup purposes.
Audit Metadata