gifgrep

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installation instructions require fetching code or binaries from github.com/steipete/gifgrep (via go install) or steipete/tap/gifgrep (via brew). These sources are personal repositories and are not affiliated with the skill author or established trusted organizations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the gifgrep binary to perform GIF searches, TUI browsing, and file extraction. This involves making network requests to Tenor/Giphy APIs and performing local file system operations, such as downloading content to ~/Downloads and using the open command (via --reveal) on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes titles, tags, and URLs from external GIF providers, which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: External metadata from Tenor and Giphy APIs (e.g., GIF titles and tags) is ingested into the agent context when listing search results.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are used to isolate untrusted external metadata from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands and write to the local file system.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the metadata fetched from the external APIs before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 16, 2026, 09:14 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gifgrep