gifgrep
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installation instructions require fetching code or binaries from
github.com/steipete/gifgrep(viago install) orsteipete/tap/gifgrep(viabrew). These sources are personal repositories and are not affiliated with the skill author or established trusted organizations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
gifgrepbinary to perform GIF searches, TUI browsing, and file extraction. This involves making network requests to Tenor/Giphy APIs and performing local file system operations, such as downloading content to~/Downloadsand using theopencommand (via--reveal) on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes titles, tags, and URLs from external GIF providers, which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External metadata from Tenor and Giphy APIs (e.g., GIF titles and tags) is ingested into the agent context when listing search results.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are used to isolate untrusted external metadata from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands and write to the local file system.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the metadata fetched from the external APIs before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata