prose
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality (
prose runand theusestatement in the DSL) allows fetching and executing.proseprogram files from remote URLs. By default, it resolves shorthand handles tohttps://p.prose.md/{path}, but also allows anyhttp://orhttps://source. These programs are interpreted by the VM and can trigger any available agent tool, including filesystem and shell access. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
SKILL.md,prose.md, andcompiler.mddocument mechanisms for fetching code and configurations from external sources likegithubusercontent.comand thep.prose.mdregistry at runtime. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]:
state/postgres.mdexplicitly warns that database credentials stored in theOPENPROSE_POSTGRES_URLenvironment variable are passed to subagent sessions and remain visible in logs. This exposure is part of the experimental PostgreSQL state management architecture. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several standard library files and examples (e.g.,
lib/vm-improver.prose,lib/profiler.prose,examples/45-plugin-release.prose) explicitly request and usebash: allowpermissions to execute arbitrary shell commands for tasks like Git operations, tool detection, and Python script execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture creates an indirect prompt injection surface. The VM (orchestrator) ingests and processes untrusted data from remote
.prosefiles and user-provided conversation histories. The DSL uses**...**discretion markers that rely on LLM judgment to evaluate conditions, which could be influenced by malicious content embedded in the ingested data. - Ingestion points: Remote
.prosefiles (SKILL.md), conversation histories (state/in-context.md), and sensitive local logs (examples/48-habit-miner.prose). - Boundary markers: The DSL uses
sessionandcontextblocks, but there is no explicit instruction to the subagents to ignore potential instructions within the context variables. - Capability inventory: Subagents have access to
sessions_spawn(Task),read,write,web_fetch, andexec(bash). - Sanitization: No evidence of automated sanitization or escaping of external content before interpolation into prompts was found in the VM specification.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]:
examples/48-habit-miner.proseis designed to scan and read conversation history logs from a wide range of AI tools including Claude Code, OpenCode, Cursor, Aider, and GitHub Copilot, exposing highly sensitive user interaction data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata