team-agent-orchestration

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a system where an orchestrator agent processes data (handoff artifacts, acceptance criteria, and review notes) generated by other agents. This creates a trust-chain vulnerability where a compromised or malicious agent in the squad could inject instructions into these artifacts to influence the orchestrator's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the orchestrator's context via handoff.md files and JSON-formatted agent cards in the Kanban system (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses status columns and schema definitions, but lacks explicit instructions to treat incoming agent data as untrusted or to sanitize embedded directives.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestration process manages file operations, branch isolation, and tool execution across multiple worktrees.
  • Sanitization: There are no documented procedures for escaping or filtering the content of handoff notes or task outputs before they are processed by the lead agent.
  • [NO_CODE]: The skill is entirely instructional and does not include any scripts, executable commands, or configuration files that perform automated actions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 1, 2026, 02:38 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — team-agent-orchestration