wonda-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Social media scraping via
wonda scrape social,wonda x search, andwonda reddit search, as well as reading device screenshots from mobile apps viawonda device screenshot. - Boundary markers: No explicit instruction delimiters or boundary markers are defined to isolate untrusted content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (via the
wondaCLI), publish content to social media (wonda publish), and perform device actions (tap,type,swipe). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the content scraped from social media or parsed from screenshots.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on executing the
wondaCLI tool to perform its primary functions, including media generation, social media interaction, and device automation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions direct the user to install external packages, including the vendor-provided
@degausai/wondaand the third-party browser automation toolpatchrightvianpm install. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages highly sensitive authentication data, including social media account passwords, API tokens (
WONDA_API_KEY), and session identifiers for X (ct0, auth-token), LinkedIn (li_at, jsessionid), and Reddit. While it uses a vault system with encryption at rest and--password-stdinfor secure input, the agent is instructed to handle and retrieve these secrets programmatically.
Audit Metadata