33god-task-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its core workflow of processing untrusted external task descriptions.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from any user prompt describing a task or from the
inboxworkspace via thetask.inbox.newevent. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or boundary markers to isolate user-provided task content from the agent's execution logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (creating
T0-subtasks.md) and perform external API calls to create developer stories on project boards. - Sanitization: There are no instructions to sanitize input or explicitly ignore potential instructions embedded within the task descriptions, allowing a malicious task description to potentially influence the agent's file-writing or ticket-creation behavior.
Audit Metadata