agents-sdk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides instructions for agents to ingest data from untrusted external sources, creating an attack surface for malicious instructions embedded in that data.
- Ingestion points include email handling (references/email.md), webhook processing (references/webhooks-push.md), and web scraping via browser tools (references/browse-the-web.md).
- Agents possess significant capabilities such as direct SQLite access, tool execution, and durable workflow management, which could be misused if an injection is successful.
- Mandatory Evidence Chain:
- Ingestion points:
onEmail(references/email.md),onRequestfor webhooks (references/webhooks-push.md),browser_search/browser_execute(references/browse-the-web.md). - Boundary markers: The documentation shows interpolation using
convertToModelMessages(references/streaming-chat.md) but does not detail explicit delimiters for raw external data. - Capability inventory: SQL query execution (
this.sql), durable fibers (runFiber), workflow management (runWorkflow), and network requests (fetch). - Sanitization: Signature verification is documented for webhooks, but general input sanitization for scraped content or email bodies is not explicitly covered in the generic examples.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents features that allow for the runtime execution of code generated or orchestrated by the AI model.
- The 'Codemode' feature (references/codemode.md) uses a
DynamicWorkerExecutorto run JavaScript in an isolated sandbox to handle complex tool chaining logic. - The Browser tools (references/browse-the-web.md) allow the LLM to write and execute asynchronous JavaScript IIFEs within a browser session for scraping and interaction.
- These are documented, intended capabilities of the SDK designed for advanced tool orchestration and automation tasks.
Audit Metadata