code-reviewer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted content from external sources, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads content from
git diff(local working tree and staged changes), GitHub Pull Request descriptions, and PR comments retrieved viagh pr checkout(as described in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters to differentiate between the agent's operational instructions and the potentially untrusted code content being reviewed.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
npm run preflight(which can execute arbitrary shell scripts defined in the project's package.json),gh pr checkout, and general file system read/write access (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the ingested code or PR metadata before it is processed by the agent's logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to perform its core functions, including interacting with the local repository and the project's build system.
- Evidence: The workflow instructs the agent to run
gh pr checkout,npm run preflight,git status, andgit diff(SKILL.md). While these are standard development tasks, executingnpm run preflighton a PR could trigger malicious scripts if the PR has modified the project's configuration files.
Audit Metadata