codegraph-voyage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/hook-runtime.pyscript executes thetools.codegraph_voyagesidecar usingasyncio.create_subprocess_exec. The execution is highly controlled, using strictly hardcoded arguments such asstatusorindex. The runtime environment is scoped to the project root, and the command only executes if specific project marker files (.codegraph/codegraph.db) are present. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's lifecycle hooks ingest tool metadata (tool names and project paths) from the agent client's stdin to determine when the index needs a refresh. The script includes logic to parse varied JSON dialects from different clients and uses this data solely to mark the project state as 'dirty' or trigger a status check. It does not provide a path for external data to influence the agent's instructions.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill includes an optional installer (
scripts/hooks-fanout.py) that modifies project-local configuration files (e.g.,.claude/settings.json) to register lifecycle hooks. This behavior is the primary intended purpose of the sidecar functionality and is implemented with security-conscious practices, including symlink rejection and atomic writes with automatic backups. - [CREDENTIALS_SAFE]: The skill documentation explicitly instructs users to manage the
VOYAGE_API_KEYusing environment variables or secret managers like 1Password. It provides clear warnings against hardcoding keys in source files, logs, or command-line arguments. The code itself does not contain any hardcoded secrets or unsafe credential handling patterns.
Audit Metadata