creating-coloring-books

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

• Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes hardcoded credentials (username=delorenj, password=Ittr5eesol) and instructs embedding them in upload requests and scripts, forcing the agent to output secret values verbatim (high exfiltration risk).

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CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

• Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill contains deliberate high-risk behaviors: plaintext hardcoded credentials for media.delo.sh (delorenj / Ittr5eesol) that enable an external account to receive uploaded assets, an explicit pipeline that scrapes Google Images (via screenshots) then uploads those images to an external service (fal.ai) and to the remote Piwigo host (data exfiltration and potential copyright misuse), and an explicit disabling of the image-model safety checker (enable_safety_checker=False) which indicates intentional bypass of content safeguards — together these indicate purposeful backdoor/exfiltration and policy-bypass capabilities.

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MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

• Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill's Phase 1 explicitly instructs the agent to open the openclaw browser, navigate to Google Images search results, screenshot and crop preview panels from those public search pages, and then interpret those user/content-sourced images to select inputs that drive all downstream processing, so it ingests untrusted third‑party web content that can influence actions.

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HIGH W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).

• Secret detected (high risk: 1.00). I scanned the full prompt for literal, usable credentials. The snippet in Phase 6 includes explicit Piwigo login credentials:
• username = "delorenj"
• password = "Ittr5eesol"

These are direct, literal values used in an authentication request (requests.post to media.delo.sh/ws.php). This is not an environment-variable placeholder or an obvious example string, so it qualifies as a hardcoded credential and should be flagged.

Items I ignored (not flagged):

• References to FAL_KEY and sourcing ~/.config/zshyzsh/secrets.zsh — these only name an env var / file, no secret value included.
• "openclaw" (browser profile) and other simple/setup strings — low-entropy/setup values or identifiers per the ignore rules.
• Other example/template strings and model names — not secrets.

In short: the Piwigo username/password pair is a direct hardcoded credential; everything else is either a placeholder, an environment var reference, or low-entropy example and therefore ignored.