managing-tickets-and-tasks-in-plane
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The library script
hooks/lib/workspace-detector.shutilizes theevalcommand to perform indirect expansion of environment variables (eval echo "\${$api_key_env:-}"). This involves executing a string as a command, which can lead to arbitrary code execution if the configuration source providing the variable name is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements automated lifecycle hooks (
hooks/pre-prompt.shandhooks/stop.sh) that execute shell commands on the host system. These scripts run automatically before and after agent sessions, performing operations withgit,curl, andjqto manage board state and session logs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: At the end of a session, the
hooks/stop.shscript automatically aggregates sensitive repository data, including staged git diffs, commit messages, and a list of modified files. This information is transmitted to external Plane API endpoints (e.g.,plane.delo.shorplane.internal.intelliforia.com). - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, including Plane API responses (ticket titles and descriptions) and local git metadata (branch names and commit history). This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content in a ticket could influence agent behavior during processing.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads workspace configuration and project identifiers from local
.plane.jsonfiles and a global configuration at~/.claude/plane-workspaces.jsonto resolve API keys and endpoint URLs.
Audit Metadata