mental-model-jotting
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONTIME_DELAYED_CONDITIONALINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill records user-supplied insights (which may include specific file paths, commands, and system configurations) and transmits this information to an external endpoint (
deepseek-v4-flash) via direct HTTP requests. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of an external shell script
hindsight-jot-flush.shand thehindsightCLI tool. Since these files are not provided as part of the skill, their logic cannot be verified and they could perform arbitrary actions on the user's system. - [TIME_DELAYED_CONDITIONAL]: The data processing and network activity are deferred until a "session-end hook" is triggered, which is a pattern of time-delayed behavior that avoids immediate detection.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface by collecting untrusted user input that is later processed by a language model to generate persistent memories.
- Ingestion points: User input through the
jotcommand stored in~/.agents/journal/jots/. - Boundary markers: Not present; the raw text is passed to an LLM for question-framing.
- Capability inventory: Local file writing and network HTTP requests.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is described in the data flow.
Audit Metadata