momo
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/lib/momo_worker_monitor.pyusessubprocess.Popento execute a command specified by the--dispatchargument. This allows for arbitrary command execution whenever a worker heartbeat fails or a retry is triggered. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/momo-board.shscript dynamically sources a shell script (ticket-provider.sh) using a path constructed from therole_dirfield in the repo's.project.jsonfile. Similarly,scripts/lib/momo_lane_gate.pyexecutes sentinel scripts from paths derived from the project structure. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill is designed to handle sensitive API keys for Plane and Trello.
scripts/momo-board.shspecifically searches for Plane API keys in~/.hermes/fleet.envor a path provided by theHERMES_FLEET_ENVenvironment variable. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to interact with ticket provider APIs, including
https://plane.delo.shandhttps://api.trello.com/1. It also publishes decision events to a NATS bus using a publisher located in theBLOODBANK_HOMEdirectory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it fetches and processes ticket titles, descriptions, and comments from external boards.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
momo-board.sh(Plane/Trello API calls). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore malicious content embedded within ticket data.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands, write to the file system, and perform network operations.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested ticket data before it is used to drive PM logic.
Audit Metadata