momo
Audited by Socket on Sep 4, 2026
4 alerts found:
Anomalyx4SUSPICIOUS: the skill’s PM-orchestration purpose mostly matches its capabilities, but it expands trust by invoking other skills, performs autonomous external workflow actions, and depends on unverifiable private local tooling/adapters. No confirmed malware, credential theft, or overt malicious data routing is shown.
This wrapper is primarily an orchestrator/dispatcher. In the provided fragment, there is no direct evidence of malicious behavior (no hardcoded credentials, no suspicious network destinations, no persistence/backdoor logic). However, it has meaningful supply-chain and execution risks: it uses eval to set shell variables and, more importantly, sources a repo-local adapter script whose path is derived from .project.json (role_dir). If .project.json or the referenced adapter file is tampered with, the wrapper will execute attacker-controlled shell code in the user’s environment. Downstream malicious activity is possible but cannot be assessed without reviewing the sourced ticket-provider.sh and bundled trello.py.
This module is primarily a monitoring/state-machine utility, not an obvious standalone malware sample. However, it includes a high-impact security feature: it can spawn an external command provided via the --dispatch argument when retries are triggered, and it forwards the full current environment to that subprocess. Because whether 'retrying' is reached depends on persisted bundle/spool contents, an attacker who can influence either --dispatch or the spool/bundle state can potentially induce unintended command execution. Additional minor supply-chain risk exists due to runtime sys.path manipulation for importing momo_handback. No clear evidence of data exfiltration or stealth mechanisms appears in the provided fragment.
This is a minimal launcher that executes code from a package-local 'lib' directory by altering sys.path and calling momo_evidence.main(). The snippet contains no direct malicious code, but the sys.path precedence change increases supply-chain risk if <package>/lib/momo_evidence is tampered with. Review and verify the integrity and behavior of momo_evidence and its imports (especially for network access, credential access, and persistence) to determine real risk.