phone-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it transcribes live audio from phone calls and feeds the resulting text directly into the LLM conversation context.
- Ingestion points: Incoming audio streams from Twilio are processed in
scripts/server.pyandscripts/server_realtime.pyto produce text transcripts. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings surrounding the interpolated user transcript in the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to a
web_searchtool (utilizing the Brave Search API) and generates streaming audio output. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on transcribed speech before it is processed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The server script executes the
ffmpegutility as a subprocess to handle audio transcoding for Twilio compatibility. - Evidence:
scripts/server.pyusesasyncio.create_subprocess_execto launchffmpegfor converting audio streams to the required mu-law format.
Audit Metadata