remotion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple documentation files instruct the agent or user to execute
npx remotion add <package>to install required dependencies. This is a standard operation within the Remotion ecosystem but involves shell command execution. - Evidence found in:
references/3d.md,references/audio.md,references/display-captions.md,references/fonts.md,references/measuring-text.md,references/videos.md, andreferences/transitions.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages downloading various external assets including Google Fonts, Lottie JSON files, and remote media files (video/audio). It also utilizes several official
@remotion/*packages and themediabunnyutility library. - Evidence found in:
references/assets.md,references/fonts.md,references/lottie.md, andreferences/import-srt-captions.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection attack surface. Several files provide code examples that fetch and process external data from user-controllable URLs (e.g., metadata from a URL, Lottie animation files, SRT subtitles). This untrusted data is then parsed and used to drive the video rendering process without explicit sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points:
references/calculate-metadata.md(props.dataUrl),references/import-srt-captions.md(SRT fetch),references/lottie.md(Lottie JSON fetch). - Boundary markers: Absent in provided examples.
- Capability inventory: Network requests via
fetch(), shell execution vianpx. - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization is demonstrated for the fetched content.
Audit Metadata