server-maintenance
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill uses
sudo -nwithinscripts/sweep.shto perform privileged operations, such as reading the kernel ring buffer (dmesg) and auditing the root user's crontab. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses sensitive system telemetry, including kernel logs, environment variables, and comprehensive process lists. It also explicitly references secret storage mechanisms, including local
secrets.zshfiles and 1Password vaults, as sources for resolving environment variables. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on extensive execution of system administration tools such as
systemctl,docker, andsrvlsto manage services and modify system state, including destructive actions like pruning containers and volumes. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits diagnostic metadata and 'memories' of the maintenance process to the vendor's external Hindsight API (
api.hs.delo.sh). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted system data from
journalctlanddocker logsto drive its forensic and diagnostic phases. It lacks sanitization or boundary markers for this data, while maintaining the authority to perform destructive system actions based on its interpretation of those logs. - Ingestion points:
journalctloutput,docker logs, and the generated sweep report file in/tmp/. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions or scripts.
- Capability inventory: High-privilege command execution (
sudo,systemctl,docker), file modification inreferences/, and the ability to stop or remove containers. - Sanitization: None identified; log output is parsed and acted upon directly by the agent.
Audit Metadata