skill-installer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates downloading skill packages from github.com and codeload.github.com. This is a core feature for remote skill installation and is scoped to well-known domains.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses the git CLI via Python's subprocess.run to perform repository clones and sparse checkouts. The implementation uses argument lists rather than shell strings, which is a standard security practice to prevent command injection.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script accesses GITHUB_TOKEN and GH_TOKEN environment variables to authenticate API requests. While this involves sensitive credential access, it is performed for the intended purpose of accessing private repositories as described in the skill documentation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and install content from external repositories, creating an attack surface where malicious metadata or instructions in the downloaded skills could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/list-skills.py (fetches directory names via GitHub API) and scripts/install-skill-from-github.py (downloads and extracts full repository archives).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not currently implement explicit boundary markers or instruction-ignoring warnings when processing or displaying metadata from downloaded skills.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities including file system writes (shutil.copytree), network access (urllib.request), and system command execution (subprocess.run).
  • Sanitization: Implements _safe_extract_zip to prevent directory traversal (ZipSlip) and uses _validate_relative_path to ensure skill installation is restricted to the intended local directory.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 06:56 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skill-installer