stitch-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions in
workflows/text-to-design.mdandworkflows/edit-design.mddirect the agent to fetch HTML and image assets from remote URLs provided by the Stitch MCP tool output. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation within the workflows suggests using
run_commandto executecurlfor downloading assets. However,run_commandis not included in theallowed-toolslist inSKILL.md, which represents a discrepancy between instructions and defined capabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow for generating design system documentation (
workflows/generate-design-md.md) involves reading HTML content from external URLs and using that data to write a.stitch/DESIGN.mdfile. This ingestion of external data combined with the capability to write to the local filesystem creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Data is fetched via
read_url_contentfromscreenshot.downloadUrlandhtmlCode.downloadUrlreturned by the Stitch API. - Boundary markers: None identified in the synthesis instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Writetool to create local files and instructions suggest shell execution. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the retrieved HTML content is specified before it is used to generate the design system document.
- [NO_CODE]: The skill consists of Markdown-based instructions and configuration without any embedded Python or JavaScript code, which reduces the potential for direct code-based attacks.
Audit Metadata