skills/delorenj/skills/stitch-design/Gen Agent Trust Hub

stitch-design

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions in workflows/text-to-design.md and workflows/edit-design.md direct the agent to fetch HTML and image assets from remote URLs provided by the Stitch MCP tool output.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation within the workflows suggests using run_command to execute curl for downloading assets. However, run_command is not included in the allowed-tools list in SKILL.md, which represents a discrepancy between instructions and defined capabilities.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow for generating design system documentation (workflows/generate-design-md.md) involves reading HTML content from external URLs and using that data to write a .stitch/DESIGN.md file. This ingestion of external data combined with the capability to write to the local filesystem creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched via read_url_content from screenshot.downloadUrl and htmlCode.downloadUrl returned by the Stitch API.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the synthesis instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Write tool to create local files and instructions suggest shell execution.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the retrieved HTML content is specified before it is used to generate the design system document.
  • [NO_CODE]: The skill consists of Markdown-based instructions and configuration without any embedded Python or JavaScript code, which reduces the potential for direct code-based attacks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 06:56 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — stitch-design