style-transfer-training
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from users, specifically image datasets and restyling prompts, which are then passed to external machine learning APIs. This presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded within the data to influence agent behavior. \n
- Ingestion points: User-provided image corpora, input photos, and restyling prompts referenced in
SKILL.md. \n - Boundary markers: The instructions in
references/evaluation-protocol.mdmandate a human review of all outputs and a side-by-side comparison between the base model and the LoRA to detect unexpected behavior. \n - Capability inventory: The skill uses network-based API calls to the
fal.aiplatform for training and inference operations. \n - Sanitization: The skill provides a 'Curation Checklist' in
SKILL.mdthat requires manual subject isolation and the aggressive culling of atypical images, which helps reduce the ingestion of malicious data. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes thefal.aiplatform, as well as Replicate and Modal, for model training and inference. These are well-known services in the artificial intelligence infrastructure space, and their integration is appropriate for the skill's stated purpose of image style transfer training. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill references the use of local shell commands likefindandmd5suminreferences/anti-patterns.mdfor dataset integrity verification. These are standard system utilities used here for diagnostic purposes.
Audit Metadata