torrent-movie
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdworkflow instructs the agent to execute a shell command:python3 scripts/add_torrent.py "<magnet_uri>". Because the<magnet_uri>is a value retrieved from an external search tool, this pattern creates a risk of command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters or closing quotes that could allow for execution of arbitrary commands. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
mcp_config.jsonconfiguration usesuvxto install and run thetorrent-search-mcppackage at runtime. Downloading and executing code from public registries without version pinning or source verification poses a supply chain risk. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on string interpolation to assemble and execute shell commands at runtime. The agent is directed to take output from one tool and pass it directly as a command-line argument to a local script without explicit sanitization steps defined in the instructions.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes search results from an external service which could contain malicious metadata designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data enters via the
search_torrentstool output. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions or script.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute local Python scripts via the shell and make network POST requests to local IP addresses.
- Sanitization: There is no logic provided to sanitize or validate the magnet URIs before they are passed to the shell or the
requestslibrary.
Audit Metadata