skills/delorenj/skills/torrent-movie/Gen Agent Trust Hub

torrent-movie

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The SKILL.md workflow instructs the agent to execute a shell command: python3 scripts/add_torrent.py "<magnet_uri>". Because the <magnet_uri> is a value retrieved from an external search tool, this pattern creates a risk of command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters or closing quotes that could allow for execution of arbitrary commands.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The mcp_config.json configuration uses uvx to install and run the torrent-search-mcp package at runtime. Downloading and executing code from public registries without version pinning or source verification poses a supply chain risk.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on string interpolation to assemble and execute shell commands at runtime. The agent is directed to take output from one tool and pass it directly as a command-line argument to a local script without explicit sanitization steps defined in the instructions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes search results from an external service which could contain malicious metadata designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters via the search_torrents tool output.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions or script.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute local Python scripts via the shell and make network POST requests to local IP addresses.
  • Sanitization: There is no logic provided to sanitize or validate the magnet URIs before they are passed to the shell or the requests library.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 06:55 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — torrent-movie