claude-skill-management
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides templates and instructions for dynamically generating shell scripts using
sedto substitute placeholders with project-specific values. If these values are derived from untrusted input, it could lead to command injection during script generation or execution. Additionally, it instructs the agent/user to modify shell startup files (~/.zshrc,~/.bashrc) to persist the$CLAUDE_METADATAenvironment variable. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill encourages 'adopting' external commands from arbitrary GitHub repositories. It provides instructions to fetch repository trees and file contents using the GitHub CLI (
gh api) and base64 decoding. This pattern facilitates the ingestion of external, unverified code into the local environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains strict behavioral overrides that forbid the agent from performing any git operations, even when explicitly requested by the user. While intended as a control measure, this constitutes an instruction override of the agent's default capabilities. Furthermore, the workflow for reading and adapting external repository content creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, as malicious instructions embedded in those repositories could influence the agent's subsequent actions during the adaptation process.
Audit Metadata