gget
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
references/workflows.mdfile includes a Python code example for caching analysis results that usespickle.load(). Thepicklemodule is insecure for deserializing data from files as it can lead to arbitrary code execution if the file content is untrusted. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Several scripts within the skill ingest external biological data files, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if malicious instructions are embedded in scientific data.
- Ingestion points: FASTA files are processed by
read_fastainscripts/batch_sequence_analysis.py, and gene lists are loaded byread_gene_listinscripts/enrichment_pipeline.py. - Boundary markers: The scripts do not use specific delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the data files.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of network communication via API calls, local file system writes, and execution of bioinformatics tools through the
ggetlibrary. - Sanitization: The data parsing logic lacks validation or sanitization of the input content before it is processed by the agent or passed to tools like
gget gpt. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: As described in
SKILL.mdand the reference documentation, thegget setupcommand facilitates the download of large external datasets and models, such as AlphaFold parameters and the ELM database, from official bioinformatics repositories to the local environment.
Audit Metadata